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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal raises issues of first impression involving statutory construction and federal 
preemption. Defendant-Appellant Scott B. Maybee ("Maybee"), an enrolled member of the 
Seneca Nation of Indians, challenges the applicability of two Idaho statutes to sales made by him 
from an out-of-state Indian reservation: the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement 
Complementary Act ("Complementary Act"), codified at Title 39, Chapter 84 of the Idaho Code, 
and the Prevention of Minors' Access to Tobacco ("Minors' Access Act"), codified at Title 39, 
Chapter 57 of the Idaho Code. 
I. Challenges to the Applicability of the Complementary Act 
a. Statutory Grounds for Dismissal 
The Complementary Act was enacted to enforce the provisions of the Tobacco Master 
Settlement Agreement Act (the "MSA Act"). LC. § 39-8401. Both statutes regulate tobacco 
manufacturers whose cigarettes are stamped and "sold in this state." Compare LC.§ 39-8403(1) 
with I.C. § 39-7803. Neither the MSA Act nor the Complementary Act regulates unstamped 
cigarettes lawfully sold in interstate commerce. Consequently, the District Court erred when it 
found that Maybee had violated the Complementary Act by selling unstamped cigarettes in 
interstate commerce to Idaho consumers. (R. 72). 
b. Constitutional Grounds for Dismissal 
Congress has been given plenary power under the Indian Commerce Clause of the United 
States Constitution to regulate the affairs of Indians. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 
Boise-215497.1 0036346-00002 11 
490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). States Jaws are presumed inapplicable to regulate the on-reservation 
conduct involving Indians, absence express congressional consent. White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980). The State has failed to demonstrate that 
"exceptional circumstances" exist to overcome this presumption by showing that Maybee' s 
conduct has off-reservation effects that impairs a significant state interest sought to be protected 
by the Complementary Act. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214-
15 (I 987); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983). Consequently, 
the State is preempted from enforcing the Complementary Act against Maybee. 
2. Preemption Challenge to the Minors' Access Act's Permit Requirement. 
Under the Minors' Access Act, tobacco retailers must possess a state permit before 
selling tobacco products to Idaho consumers. LC.§§ 39-5704(1), 39-5718(1). Although the sale 
or distribution of tobacco products without a permit is "considered by the state of Idaho as an 
effort to subvert the state's public purpose to prevent minor's access to tobacco products," the 
State has failed to show that Maybee's sales without a permit has the off-reservation effect of 
subverting the State's "public purpose to prevent minor's access to tobacco products." LC. § 39-
5709. Absent an off-reservation effect, the State is preempted under the Indian Commerce 
Clause from imposing a permit requirement on a Native American tobacco seller whose sales are 
conducted on tribal land. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 
1312 (D. Mont. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463, 480-481. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Maybee is an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation of Indians ("Seneca Nation"), a 
Boise-215497.1 0036346-00002 12 
federally recognized Indian tribe whose tribal territory is located within western New York State. 
(COE #6 ,r,r 2-3). The Seneca Nation has given Maybee a license to operate, as a sole proprietor, 
a tobacco retail business on its Allegany Indian Territory. (COE #6 ,rir 4, 6). From his place of 
business, Maybee sells cigarettes in interstate commen.:e to consumers, over the age of 21, for 
their personal use and consumption. (COE #6 ,r 17). 
Maybee has no offices, employees, sale representatives, agents, inventory or other 
tangible property in Idaho. (COE #6, iJ27). Idaho consumers transmit their orders via the 
Internet, by phone or by mail to Maybee at his place of business on the Seneca Nation territory. 
(COE #6, iJ24). Before an order is accepted, the customer's age, identity, and address are 
verified in accordance with Maybee's business practices that ensure tobacco products are sold 
only to adults for their own personal consumption. (COE #6, ,r,r 17-18). The customers select 
the method of mailing (i.e., priority mail or express mail), and pay all postage charges. (COE #6, 
,r 24). After Maybee receives the customer's payment, goods are packaged and picked up by the 
U.S. Postal Service for mailing. (COE #6, ,r 24). Once packages are given to the U.S. Postal 
Service, they cannot be retrieved by Maybee. (COE #6, ,r 25). The U.S. Postal Service delivers 
these orders to Idaho customers and obtains the customer's signature on all first orders. (COE 
#6, ,r ,r 21, 24). Maybee conducts these non-face-to-face sales, commonly known as "delivery 
sales," without leaving his place of business on the reservation. (COE #6, iJ25). 
There are more than 1800 websites offering to sell tobacco products to Idaho consumers. 
(COE #7, Ex. F &t !DAG 139650). Most of these sites do not report their delivery sales or 
inform buyers of their responsibility to pay all applicable taxes. (COE #7, Ex. F at IDAG 
Boise-215497.1 0036346-00002 13 
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139651). Maybee is unlike most delivery sellers. He reports all shipments of unstamped 
cigarettes on a monthly basis to the State pursuant to the Jenkins Act, 15 U.S.C. § 376. (COE 
#6, i\29). He informs Idaho consumers that they are responsible for the payment of all applicable 
Idaho taxes and that it is illegal to sell or give tobacco products to minors. (COE #6, i!29, Ex. 
A). Maybee, however, is the only delivery seller to have ever been sued by the State. (COE #7, 
Exs. G - I). 
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On September 22, 2006, the State filed its verified complaint with the District Court of 
the Fourth Judicial District for the County of Ada ("District Court"). (R. 27). In its first cause of 
action, the State alleges that Maybee violated the Complementary Act by selling and offering for 
sale to Idaho consumers cigarettes not listed on a "directory" of all cigarette brands that are 
approved for sale in the State (the "Directory"). (R. 17). In its second cause of action, the State 
alleges that Maybee has violated the Minors' Access Act by making delivery sales without a 
tobacco permit and by failure to comply with its notice and disclosure requirements. (R. 17-18). 
After conducting discovery, the State did not contest Maybee's assertions that he complies with 
these notice and disclosure requirements. (R. 43). 
After hearing a motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, the Honorable Kathryn 
A. Sticklen granted the State's motion for summary judgment in a Memorandum Decision issued 
on October 31, 2007. (R. 4, 40). On February 26, 2008, Judge Sticklen denied Maybee's motion 
for reconsideration. (R. 70). On the same day, a judgment was entered enjoining Maybee from 
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selling cigarettes not listed on the Directory and from shipping cigarettes without a permit. (R. 
77). On April 8, 2008, Maybee filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 80). 
D. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1. Idaho's MSA Act and Complementary Act 
In 1997, the Nation's four largest tobacco companies, Phillip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, 
Lorillard and Brown & Williamson, dominated the market by selling 99.58350% of all cigarettes 
sold in the United States. (COE #7, Ex.D 127). On November 23, 1998, the Attorneys General 
of 46 states, five U.S. territories and the District of Columbia (the "Settling States") settled 
various legal actions involving antitrust, product liability and consumer protection claims against 
these leading tobacco manufacturers by entering into the Master Settlement Agreement. LC. § 
39-7801(e); (COE #7, Ex. D i12); (COE #7, Ex. D at !DAG 139187). Idaho is one of the Settling 
States under the Master Settlement Agreement. LC. § 39-7801(e). In exchange for releases of 
past, present and certain future claims brought against them, these settling manufactures 
("participating manufacturers") agreed "to pay substantial sums to the state (tied in part to their 
volume of sales)." Id. 
Under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement, the State is obligated to enact and 
enforce a "qualifying statute" that "effectively and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantage that 
Participating Manufacturers experience vis-a-vis Non-Participating Manufacturers within such 
Settling States as a result of the provisions" of the Master Settlement Agreement. (COE #7, Ex. 
D il33). The settling parties attached to the Master Settlement Agreement a model qualifying 
statute. (COE 7, Ex. D. at IDAG 139212). Most, if not all, Settling States have enacted the 
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model qualifying statute that obligates non-participating manufacturers to make escrow 
payments. 1 These qualifying statutes, however, only require escrow payments to be made. on the 
number of cigarette "units sold" in a state, not the "units used" in a state. 
In 1999, the State adopted the model qualified statute and enacted the MSA Act. (R. 9 
,i7; COE #7, Ex. D i!36). The MSA Act imposes legal obligation only on tobacco manufacturers 
and sets forth the procedure for a non-participating manufacturer "selling cigarettes to consumers 
within the state" to make escrow payments. LC. § 39-7803. Not all brands sold to Idaho 
consumers are subject to escrow payments. Non-participating manufacturers are only required to 
make escrow payments based on the number of"units sold" in the State. 
"Units sold means the number of individual cigarettes sold in the state by the 
applicable tobacco product manufacturer (where directly or through a distributor, 
retailer or similar intermediary of intermediaries) during the year in question, as 
measured by excise taxes collected by the state on packs ( or "roll-your-own" 
tobacco containers) bearing the excise tax stamps of the state .... 
LC. § 39-7802(j). There are three important elements to the "units sold" definition: (I) 
"cigarettes sold in the state," (2) "as measured by excise taxes collected by the state," and (3) 
"bearing the excise stamp of the state." Federal and state laws permit the sale of unstamped 
cigarettes in interstate commerce. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 314 (1992); IDAPA 
1 Compare Idaho Code§ 39-7802 with Ala. Code§ 6-12-2; Alaska Stat. § 45.53.100; Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 44-7101; 
Ark. Code Ann.§ 26-57-260; Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 104556; Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 4-28h; Del. Code§ 6081; 
Ga. Code. Ann.§_ l0-13A-2; Haw. Rev. State.§ 675-2, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.168, par. JO (Smith-Hurd); Ind. Code§ 24-
3-3-11; Iowa Code. Ann.§ 453C; Kan. State. Ann.§ 50-6a02; La. Rev. Stat. tit. 13 § 5062; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 
22 § 1580-H; Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg.§ 16-501; Mich. Comp. Laws§ 445.2051; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 196,1000; 
Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 69-2702; Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 370A.120; N.H. Rev. Stat.§ 541-C:2; N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 6-4-12; N.Y. 
Pub. Health Law§ 1399-oo, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-290; N.D. Cent. Code § 51-25-01; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
1346.01; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 37 § 600.22; R.l. Gen. Law§ 23-71-2; S.C. Code Ann. § 11-47-20; Tenn. Code Ann. § 
47-31-102; Utah Code Ann.§ 59-22-202; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 1913; Wash. Rev. Code§ 70.157.010; W. Va. 
Code§ 16-9B-2; Wyo. Stat.§ 9-4-1201. 
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35.01.10.013; IDAPA 35.01. 10.022. Unstamped cigarettes sold in interstate commerce are not 
considered "cigarettes sold in the state" for purposes of the MSA Act. (COE# 7, Ex. D 'i!35). 
Under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement, the State is only required to 
diligently enforce its own qualifying statute by requiring escrow payments for all "units sold" in 
Idaho. (COE# 7, Ex. D 'i!33). The State, therefore, has no obligation to enforce New York's 
qualifying statute or to collect escrow payments for units sold in New York. 
A Settling State's failure to enact or diligently enforce its qualifying statute could subject 
the Settling State, under certain circumstances, to a reduction in payments received from 
participating manufacturers under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA 
payments'). (COE# 7, Ex. D 'il'il 25-35). If participating manufacturers can show that the Master 
Settlement Agreement has been a significant factor in their Joss of market share to non-
participating manufacturers and that a Settling State has not enacted or diligently enforced its 
qualifying statute, then participating manufacturers would be entitled to a downward adjustment 
to their MSA payments. (Id.) This downward adjustment is known as an "NPM Adjustment." 
(COE# 7, Ex. D 'ii 25). 
In 2003, the Legislature found that violations of the MSA Act threatened not only the 
integrity of the Master Settlement Agreement, but also the fiscal soundness of the State. l.C. § 
39-8401. The Complementary Act was enacted so that non-participating tobacco manufacturers 
could not avoid their escrow obligations under the MSA Act. LC. § 39-8401. It imposes 
obligations not only on tobacco manufacturers, but also on any "wholesaler, distributor, retailer, 
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or similar intermediary or intermediaries" ( collectively, "tobacco dealers") that distribute 
cigarettes for sale in the state. LC. § 39-8403. 
The Complementary Act requires "[ e ]very tobacco manufacturer whose cigarettes are 
sold in this state" to deliver a certification to the Idaho Attorney General containing a list of all 
cigarette brands previously or currently being "sold in the state." LC. § 39-8403(1). From these 
certifications, the Attorney General develops and publishes the Directory. l.C. § 39-8403(2). 
Cigarettes not listed on the Directory may not be stamped, sold, offered or possessed "for sale in 
this state." LC. § 39-8403(3); LC. § 39-8406(3). 
Before a cigarette brand can be certified and approved for sale "in the state," the tobacco 
manufacturer must either be a participating manufacturer or a non-participating manufacturer 
that has agreed to make escrow payments based on the number of cigarettes "sold in the state." 
LC. § 39-8403(2)(b). A participating manufacturer must "include in its certification a list of its 
brand families" and affirm that listed brands are "deemed to be its cigarettes for purposes of 
calculating its payment under the master settlement agreement." I.C. § 39-8403(1 )(a); LC. § 39-
8403(1 )( d)(i). A non-participating manufacturer must include in its certification "a complete 
list" of all brand families that were sold in the State at any time during the preceding or current 
calendar year, along with the number of "units sold" for each brand. LC. § 39-8403(l)(b). A 
non-participating manufacturer must also affirm that listed brands are deemed cigarettes for 
purposes of calculating its escrow payment under the MSA Act. LC. § 39-8403(1)(d)(ii). 
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The Directory contains not only a complete list of brands that may be "sold in the State," 
but also the brands on which MSA and escrow payments will be made. The unit cost for 
calculating escrow payments for non-participating manufacturers is the same for calculating 
MSA payments for participating manufacturers. LC. § 39-7803(b)(2)(B). Thus, by requiring 
non-participating manufacturers to make escrow payments based on the "units sold" in the State, 
the MSA Act and Complementary Act "effectively and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantage 
that Participating Manufacturers experience vis-a-vis Non-Participating Manufacturers within 
such Settling State as a result of the provisions" of the Master Settlement Agreement. (COE #7, 
Ex. D i)33, citing MSA § IX (d)(2)(E) [ emphasis added]). 
2. Idaho's Minors' Access Act 
The Legislature enacted the Minors' Access Act "to prevent the illegal sale, theft and 
easy access of tobacco products to minors and to prohibit the possession, distribution and use of 
tobacco products by minors." LC. § 39-5701. The Minors' Access Act regulates both face-to-
face sales and delivery sales to ensure that tobacco products are not sold to minors. LC. § 39-
5703 through 39-5713 (regulates face-to-face sales); LC. § 39-5714 through 39-5718 (regulates 
delivery sales). 
The Minors' Access Act sets forth certain requirements for delivery sales, including age 
verification requirements, disclosure and notice requirements, shipping requirements, registration 
and reporting requirements, and appHcable tax collection requirements. LC. § 39-5714(2). 
Intrastate delivery sales are also subject to: 
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all other laws of the state of Idaho generally applicable to sales of tobacco 
products that occur entirely within Idaho, including, but not limited to, those laws 
imposing excise taxes, sales and use taxes, licensing and tax stamping 
requirements and escrow or other payment obligations. 
Id. The Minors' Access Act further provides that "[p]rior to making delivery sales or shipping 
tobacco products in connection with such sales," a delivery seller must obtain a state tobacco 
permit from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. LC.§ 39-5718(1). 
According to the State, "[t]he permit requirement contributes to the State's effort at 
controlling the ability of minors to obtain tobacco by ensuring that [the State] has a central 
repository of all businesses marketing tobacco to Idaho residents with a uniform set of data 
which facilitates compliance monitoring and, where necessary, enforcement actions." (COE # 8 
at p. 18). In applying for a tobacco permit, a delivery seller is required to provide "a statement 
setting forth the seller's name, trade name and the address of the business's principal place of 
business and any other place of business." l.C. § 39-5718(1). The Jenkins Act similarly requires 
an out-of-state delivery seller to "file with the tobacco tax administrator of the State into which 
such shipment is made ... a statement setting forth his name and trade name (if any), and the 
address of his principal place of business and of any other place of business." 15 U.S.C. § 
376(a)(l). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
l. Are the provisions of the Complementary Act, which makes it unlawful for a 
person "[t]o sell, offer, or possess for sale in this state, cigarettes of a tobacco product 
manufacturer or brand family not included in the directory" applicable to a Native American 
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tobacco seller who makes delivery sales without leaving his place of business on an out-of-state 
Indian reservation? 
2. Is the provision of the Minors' Access Act, which requires a delivery seller to 
obtain a tobacco permit before making a delivery sale to an Idaho consumer, pre-empted under 
federal law when enforcement is sought against an out-of-state Native American delivery seller 
who mails tobacco products from an out-of-state reservation only to adult consumers, and then 
reports those shipments each month to the State? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Constitutional issues are purely questions of law; therefore, this Court exercises free 
review over such issues. Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 13 l Idaho 258, 260, 954 P.2d 676, 678 
(1998). This Court also freely reviews issues of statutory interpretation. Big Sky Paramedics, 
LLC v. Sagle Fire Dist., 140 Idaho 435,436, 95 P.3d 53, 54 (2004). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMPLEMENTARY ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO DELIVERY 
SALES MADE FROM AN OUT-OF-ST ATE INDIAN RESERVATION 
A. Applying Conventional Rules of Statutory Construction, Maybee Cannot Be 
Found in Violation of the Complementary Act. 
The State argued to the District Court that Maybee is subject to the Complementary Act 
because he "introduces noncompliant tobacco into the State." (COE #8 at pp. 10, 13). 
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Undisputedly, Maybee has sold in interstate commerce unstamped cigarettes not listed on the 
Directory to Idaho consumers. However, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the pivotal 
question is not whether Maybee has "introduce[ d] ... into the State" cigarettes not listed on the 
Directory, but whether these cigarettes were ever "sold in the State." 
1. The MSA Act and the Complementary Act Are In Pari Materia and 
Must Be Applied Harmoniously and Consistently with Each Other. 
The Legislature enacted the Complementary Act as a "procedural enhancement" to the 
enforcement of the MSA Act. J.C. § 39-8401. Both statutes require "cigarettes sold in the state" 
to be manufactured by tobacco companies that are either participating manufacturers or non-
participating manufacturers that have filed annual certifications with the Idaho Attorney General 
attesting to the "number of units sold in the state" on which they have made escrow payments. 
Compare§ I.C. 39-8403 (l) with I.C. § 39-7803. Because the statutes relate to the same subject 
matter, the MSA Act and the Complementary Act are in part mater/a and must be construed 
together to effect their legislative intent. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway 
Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003). No provision within either statute, however, 
should be construed as redundant or superfluous. State v. Folsom, 139 Idaho 626, 630, 84 P.3d 
563, 566 (2003). 
The District Court failed to recognized that the MSA Act and the Complementary Act are 
in part mater/a and must be construed together to effect their legislative intent. See Sandpoint, 
139 Idaho at 69, 72 P.3d at 909. Construed as a whole, these statutes create a "complementary 
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and cohesive" scheme regulating the sale of stamped cigarettes in intrastate commerce. In 
rejecting this argument, the District Court wrote: 
The Court is not persuaded that Maybee had a reasonable belief that the 
[Complementary Act] applied only to "units sold" measured by "excise taxes 
collected by the State on packs ... bearing the excise tax stamp of the state." 
Idaho Code§ 39-7802(j). Idaho Code§ 39-7802(j) is part of the [Complementary 
Act], which applies only to manufacturers. However, the [Complementary Act] 
clearly makes it unlawful for anyone to sell cigarettes of manufacturers or 
families not included on the directory, not "units sold." 
(R. 74-75) (emphasis added). The District Court accepted the State's arguments that: 
[t]he Complementary Act .. .is much broader in scope because it prohibits the 
sale of non-compliant cigarettes, a tenn that incorporates both stamped cigarettes 
(units sold) and unstamped cigarettes. 
(COE #8 at p. 23). It also rejected Maybee's argument that the word "cigarettes" cannot be read 
in isolation or in contravention of the "complementary and cohesive" scheme enacted by the 
Legislature. (R. 74-75). 
The Complementary Act was enacted so that non-participating tobacco manufacturers 
could not avoid their escrow obligations under the MSA Act. I.C. § 39-8401. It imposes 
obligations not only on tobacco manufacturers, but also on "tobacco dealers" that distribute 
cigarettes for sale in the state. LC. § 39-8403. Under the Complementary Act, no person may 
not stamp, sell, offer or possess cigarettes not listed on the Directory "for sale in this state." LC. 
§ 39-8403(3); LC. § 39-8406(3). 
Because the MSA Act only requires non-participating manufacturers to make escrow 
payments for units sold in the State, the Complementary Act only requires non-participating 
manufacturers "whose cigarettes are sold in this state" to certify those brands previously or 
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currently being "sold in the state." See LC. § 39-7803; LC. § 39-8403(1). The Directory, 
therefore, does not list all cigarette brands intended for sale in the United States or available for 
sale outside of the State. 
In its motion for summary judgment, the State made three significant concessions. First, 
the State conceded that the MSA Act only requires escrow payments based on the number of 
cigarettes stamped for sale in the State. (COE #8 at p. 23). Second, the State admitted that Idaho 
tax stamps are not affixed on cigarettes sold in interstate commerce, on military bases, or by 
Indians on Indian reservations. (COE #7, Ex. D i/35). Finally, the State acknowledges that 
Maybee may lawfully ship unstamped cigarettes to Idaho consumers for their personal use and 
consumption. (COE #8 at p.21); LC. § 63-2512(b).2 Since Maybee may lawfully sell unstamped 
cigarettes in interstate commerce, those sales, as the State has conceded, do not trigger the 
application of the MSA Act. Despite these concessions, the State argues that the Complementary 
Act limits Maybee's ability to "introduce" or "market non-compliant tobacco for delivery to 
Idaho consumers." (COE #8 at p. 13). 
The Legislature has made clear that the Complementary Act was only enacted to prevent 
violations of the MSA Act. LC. § 39-8401. By restricting tobacco dealers from stamping, 
2 Out-of-state tobacco sellers that have no substantial nexus to the State cannot be required to collect or 
remit taxes on their interstate sales. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Cigarettes sold in intrastate 
commerce, however, must bear an Idaho tax stamp. State law do not prohibit an Idaho consumer from 
purchasing gng carton (10 packs or less) of unstamped cigarettes from an out-of-state delivery seller. 
Accord J.C.§ 63-2512 (\,). Because. the State restricts the number of cigarettes that may be purchased in 
interstate commerce without restricting the number of cigarettes that may be purchased in intrastate 
commerce, it discriminates against and unduly burdens interstate commerce. Quill, 504 U.S. 298; 
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). Since this issue was not raised in the District Court, Maybee does 
not challenge in this appeal the provisions of J.C.§ 63-2512 (b) which allows Idaho consumers to acquire 
only one carton of unstamped cigarette from a delivery seller. 
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selling, offering or possessing non-compliant brands for sale in the State, the Complementary 
Act is the procedural mechanism employed by the State to diligently enforce of the MSA Act. 
LC. § 39-8403(3); I.C. 39-8406. Nothing in the Complementary Act, however, suggests that the 
Legislature intended the Complementary Act to be "much broader in scope" than the MSA Act. 
In fact, the Complementary Act states that if a court of competent jurisdiction finds that the 
provisions of the two acts conflict and cannot be harmonized, then the provisions of the MSA 
Act should control. I.C. § 39-8407(7). Consequently, the State's assertions that the Legislature 
intended the Complementary Act to be "much broader in scope" than the MSA Act must be 
rejected. 
2. The Legislature Did Not Intend the MSA Act and the Complementary 
Act to Regulate Sales Made by an Out-of-State Delivery Seller. 
As this Court has repeatedly held, a statute must be construed to give effect to its 
legislative intent. See, ~, Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 149 P.3d 833 (2006); 
Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69, 72 P.3d at 909; Folsom, 139 Idaho 626 at 84 P.3d at 666. The Court 
"must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." Id. 
Under the Complementary Act, it is unlawful for any person to affix an Idaho tax stamp 
on cigarettes not listed on the Directory. LC. § 39-8403(3)(a). Under Idaho law, Idaho tax 
stamps are affixed to cigarettes that are sold, offered or possessed "for sale in this state." Accord 
LC. § 63-2508. Tax stamps, however, are not affixed to cigarettes sold in interstate commerce, 
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on a military base, or by Indians on an Indian reservation. IDAPA 35.01.10.013; IDAPA 
35.01 .10.014; ID APA 35.01.10.022. 
Construed as a whole and m harmony with the provisions of the MSA Act, the 
Complementary Act only regnlates the intrastate sales of stamped cigarettes. Under the MSA 
Act, non-participating manufacturers are only required to make escrow payments on the number 
of cigarettes stamped for sale in the State. LC.§ 39-7803(b)(l). Under the Complementary Act, 
non-participating manufacturers must certified those brands previously or currently sold and 
stamped in the State upon which escrow payments have been or will be collected. LC. § 39-
8403(l)(b). Since the Complementary Act was enacted to prevent a violation of the MSA Act, 
the Court should construe the Complementary Act as applicable to only intrastate sales of 
cigarettes stamped for sale in the State. Since the undisputed facts in this case show that Maybee 
lawfully sells unstamped cigarettes in interstate commerce to Idaho consumers, Maybee cannot 
be found in violation of the Complementary Act. 
a. Maybee lawfully sells unstamped cigarettes in interstate commerce. 
Out-of-state delivery sellers that have no substantial nexus to the State cannot be required 
to collect or remit taxes on goods sold in interstate commerce to Idaho consumers. Quill, 504 
U.S. at 314. Because Maybee has no offices, employees, sale representatives, agents, inventory 
or other tangible property in Idaho, the State does not dispute that he is not required to collect or 
remit state cigarette taxes. (COE #6 i]27; COE #8 at p. 21). Under Idaho law, Idaho consumers 
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may purchase unstamped cigarettes in an interstate transaction. Accord LC. § 63-2512(b). 3 The 
State has conceded that unstamped cigarettes sold in interstate commerce do not trigger the 
application of the MSA Act. (COE #8 at p. 23; COE #7, Ex. D 135). Since the Complementary 
Act was enacted to prevent a violation of the MSA Act, the Court must conclude that the 
Legislature did not intend interstate sales of unstamped cigarettes to be regulated by either the 
MSA Act or the Complementary Act. 
The State argues that Maybee's sales are regulated by the Complementary Act because he 
"introduces non-compliant tobacco into the State." (COE #8 at p. 13). The Complementary Act, 
however, does not state that it is unlawful for a person to "introduce," a person outside of the 
State to "export," or a person within the State to "import" cigarettes not listed on the Directory 
into the State. This is yet another indication that the Legislature did not intend the 
Complementary Act to regulate interstate commerce or Maybee's delivery sales of unstamped 
cigarettes. 
b. Maybee does not offer or possess cigarettes for sale in Idaho. 
The State charges Maybee with a violation of Idaho Code§ 39-8403(3)(b). This section 
of the Complementary Act provides that: 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o sell, offer or possess for sale in this 
state, cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in 
the directory. 
Since the Complementary Act applies only to intrastate sales of cigarettes stamped for sale in the 
State, LC.§ 39-8403(3)(b) should be interpreted to mean no person shall "sell, offer, or possess" 
' See discussion in footnote 2. 
BOise-215497,10036346-00002 27 
cigarettes not listed on the Directory "for sale in this state." Under this interpretation, the State 
would prohibit in-state tobacco sellers from keeping cigarettes not listed on the Directory in their 
storerooms, warehouses or other locations where cigarettes "possessed for sale" are generally 
kept. This provision would also prohibit in-state tobacco sellers from offering or displaying for 
sale cigarettes not listed on the Directory in their stores or outlets. 
The State does not claim that Maybee has "possess[ ed] for sale in the state" any 
cigarettes. (R. 18 ,JI). Instead, the State claims that Maybee has violated this provision by 
offering for sale in Idaho cigarettes not listed on the Directory. (R. 18 ,Jl ). 
The Complementary Act does not define the word "offer" or the phrase "offer for sale." 
The State asserts that Maybee offers non-compliant cigarettes to Idaho consumers by advertising 
over the Internet and through the mail. (COE #3, Bxs. C and D). The word "offer" and the 
phrase "offer for sale" cannot be interpreted to mean "advertise for sale." The United States 
Supreme Court has held that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution pre-empts 
any state law or regulation that restricts or prohibits the advertising of any cigarettes, the package 
of which is labeled in conformity with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
("FCLAA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550-51 
(2001). Since the Legislature is presumed to have acted within its constitutional authority, this 
Court must construe this provision in a manner that would render the statute constitutional. 
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 814, 135 P.3d 756, 760 (2006). 
Maybee, therefore, cannot be found in violation of the Complementary Act simply because he 
advertises to Idaho consumers cigarettes not listed on the Directory. 
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In construing the Complementary Act as the whole, this Court should conclude that the 
word "offer" as used in § 39-8403 (3) (b) of the Complementary Act is modified by the phrase 
"for sale in this state." In discussing the penalty for a violation of the provision, the 
Complementary Act states that "[a]ny cigarettes that have had stamps affixed, been sold, offered 
for sale or possessed for sale in this state in violation of section 39-8403(3) shall be deemed 
contraband ... and such cigarettes sha1l be subject to seizure and forfeiture .... " LC. § 39-
8406 (3). Because the State lacks the constitutional power to seize cigarettes possessed and 
offered for sale outside of Idaho, only cigarettes possessed and offered "for sale in this state in 
violation of section 39-8403(3)" may "be subject to seizure and forfeiture." More importantly, if 
the Complementary Act does not regulate cigarettes sold in interstate commerce, then it would 
be inconsistent to hold that the Complementary Act regulates cigarettes "offered for sale" in 
interstate commerce. The Complementary Act, therefore, only prohibits cigarettes not listed on 
the Directory from being offered "for sale in this state." Since Maybee does not possess or offer 
cigarettes "for sale in this state," he cannot be found in violation of§ 39-8403(3)(b) of the 
Complementary Act. 
c. Maybee does not sell cigarettes in Idaho. 
From the perspective of the Complementary Act, one fact in this case is indisputable -
Maybee does not sell in intrastate commerce. He engages in interstate sales of unstamped 
cigarettes to Idaho consumers. Despite the State's concession that unstamped cigarettes sold in 
interstate commerce are not "units sold in the State," the District Court held that Maybee violated 
the Complementary Act because "the sales in questions do take place in Idaho." (R. 45). 
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Although Maybee cited another Idaho statute, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, to support his claim that his sales do not take place in the State, neither the District Court 
nor the State cited any legal authority on the situs of sale issue. Instead, both the District Court 
and the State merely rejected the authority relied upon by Maybee to show that, as a matter of 
law, his delivery sales take place outside ofidaho. (R. 44-45, 71, 74-75; COE #8 at pp. 4-9). 
i. Maybee 's sales take place outside of Idaho in accordance 
with the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), codified as Title 28, Chapter 2 of 
the Idaho Code, governs the sales of goods in Idaho. A sale is defined under the U.C.C. as the 
passing of title from a seller to a buyer for a price. I.C. § 28-2-106(1). Black's Law Dictionary 
(5th Ed.) similarly defines a sale as: 
A contract between two parties, called, respectively, the "seller" ( or vendor) and 
the "buyer" ( or the purchaser), by which the former, in consideration of the 
payment or promise of payment of a certain price in money, transfers to the latter 
the title and the possession of property. 
Since the Complementary Act regulates only "cigarettes sold in the state," it has no applicability 
to cigarette sales made by an out0of-state seller when title and possession of such cigarettes 
passes outside ofidaho. 
In a delivery sale, a consumer places an order with the seller with the expectation that 
goods will be "delivered" to the consumer. I.C. § 39-5702(2). Absent an explicit agreement to 
the contrary, the Legis_ lature has determined that, when a seller is authorized to send goods to a . . 
buyer and delivers such goods to a carrier, such as the United States Postal Service, title to the 
goods passes from the seller to the buyer at the time aad place of shipment, thereby completing 
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the sale transaction. l.C. § 28-2-401 (2)(a). Since cigarettes are delivered to United States Postal 
Service for mailing outside of Idaho, Maybee's delivery sales take place outside of Idaho. 
Neither the District Court nor the State disputed this U.C.C. interpretation. 
The District Court erroneously adopted the State's argument that the U.C.C. does not 
apply to "public" regulations such as the Complementary Act. (R. at 44-45, 71; COE #8 at pp 4-
6). The District Court arrived at its conclusion by misinterpreting an official comment that 
follows LC.§ 28-2-401, which reads as follows: 
This section, however, in no way intends to indicate which line of interpretation 
should be followed in cases where the applicability of "public" regulation 
depends upon a "sale" or upon the location of "title" without further definition. 
This official comment speaks to situations where prior case law dealing with public regulations 
may now conflict with the provisions of LC.§ 28-2-401. 
Prior to a state's adoption of the U.C.C., state courts may have decided cases where the 
applicability of "public" regulation depends upon a "sale" or upon the location of "title." The 
official comment was added by the drafters to signify that LC. § 28-2-401 did not intend for 
those prior cases to be ignored for purposes of deciding when or where a "sale" takes place. The 
official comments merely state that it is for a court to decide "which line of interpretation should 
be followed." 
Although the U.C.C. sets forth the "right, obligation and remedies of the seller, buyer, 
purchasers or other third parties" with regards to the sale of good "irrespective of title," the 
drafter recognized that there are situations where "matters concerning title becomes material." 
LC. § 28-2-401. As the official comment later states, 
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[i]t is therefore necessary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes under this 
Article in case the courts deems any public regulation to incorporate the defined 
term of the "private" law.4 
The official comment, therefore, contemplates that courts may look to the U.C.C. to guide them 
in deciding if, when, or where a sale has occurred to determine the applicability of a public 
regulation. 
Because the Complementary Act makes it unlawful for any person to sell, offer, or 
possess cigarettes not listed on the Directory "for sale in this state," the Court must decide 
whether this provision is applicable to Maybee's delivery sales. I.C. § 39-8403(3)(b). Because 
this is an issue of first impression, the Court does not have the benefit of prior case law. 
Therefore, it is appropriate for this Court to be guided by the provisions of Idaho Code § 28-2-
401. 
Both the District Court and the State ignored the fact that this Court has, as other state 
courts have, applied this U.C.C. section to public regulations. This Court cited, as authority, 
Idaho Code § 28-2-401 to determine whether a "sale at retail" had occurred, requiring the 
collection of Idaho sales taxes. Old West Reality, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 110 I 546, 
548-49, 716 P.2d 1318, 1320-21 (1986). The appeal was brought to challenge the Tax 
Commission's determination that the transfer of multiple listing booklets from a listing service to 
real estate brokers was a taxable event under the Idaho Sales Tax Act. The Idaho Sales Tax Act 
imposes a sales tax on all "sales at retail" of tangible property. Id. at 548, 716 P.2d at 1320. The 
4 The term "private" Jaw means a law that determines the rights, obligations and remedies between private 
individuals, as opposed to "public" laws that determines the rights and obligations of members of the public, as well 
as the penalties for the breach of such public obligations. 
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listing service claimed that multiple listing booklet was provided as a service, not a sale, to real 
brokers who subscribed to its monthly service. Id. This Court disagreed and held that the 
"delivery" of multiple listing booklets was a "sale at retail" of tangible property under the U.C.C. 
Id. at 548-49, 716 P.2d at 1320-21 (citing LC.§ 28-2-401). 
State courts have often decided tax liability issues involving the sale of goods with 
reference to the U.C.C. See, "'-&, Franklin Fibre-Lamitex Coro. v. Director of Revenue, 505 
A.2d 1296, 1298 (Del. Sup. 1985); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 439 
Mass. 629, 635 (2003); In re Valley Media, Inc., 226 Fed. Appx, 120, 122-123 (3d Cir. 2007). 
For example, in Franklin Fibre-Lamitex, a Delaware tax statute imposed upon wholesalers a 
gross receipt tax on all goods "sold within this State." 505 A.2d at 1298. The phrase "sold 
within this State" was not expressly defined in the tax statute. Id. The court found it "therefore 
permissible to look to related statutes and principles of statutory construction to detennine its 
meaning." Id. The Delaware court went on to state that: 
the draftsmen of the U.C.C. anticipated that courts would use§ 2-401 in situations 
where the passage of title is important. "It is therefore necessary to state what a 
'sale' is and when title passes under this Article in case the courts deem any 
public regulation to incorporate the defined term of the 'private' law." U.C.C. § 
2-401 Official Comment (1978). 
Id. at 1299. 
Similarly, California courts have cited to U.C.C. § 2-401 to determine the applicability of 
its "lemon" law. See,"'-&, Carlson v. Monaco Coach Corp, 486 F. Supp_.2d 1127, 1 BO (E.D. 
Cal. 2007); California State Electronics Assn. v. Zeos Internal. Ltd., 41 Cal App.4th 1270, 49 
Cal. Rptr.2d 127 (1996). These cases involved the applicability of California's Song-Beverly 
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Consumer Warranty Act, a public regulation that is expressly limited to consumer goods sold in 
California. In Zeos, the California court held that the California statute did not apply to goods 
shipped by a Minnesota retailer to a buyer in California. Id. at 1277, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 132. The 
court found that title passed at the place of shipment in Minnesota pursuant to V.C.C. § 2-401. 
Id. In Carlson, a recreational vehicle had been purchased from a California RV dealer for 
delivery to the purchasers in Nevada. 486 F. Supp. at 1128. The California dealer asserted that 
the purchasers wanted delivery in Nevada to avoid payment of California sales taxes. Id. The 
court, however, looked to V.C.C. § 2-401 to determine the situs of sale. Id. at 1130. The court 
found that the parties had agreed that the dealer would ship the vehicle to Nevada, but did not 
require the dealer to make the delivery at the Nevada destination. Id. at 1131. Consequently, the 
federal court held that the sale took place when the vehicle was shipped from California pursuant 
to U.C.C. § 2-401. The transaction, therefore, was covered by the California warranty statute. 
Id. at 1132. 
In S.K.I. Beer Corp. v. Barilka Brewers, 443 F. Supp.2d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), a New 
York beer wholesaler brought an action in federal court against a Russian brewery, claiming the 
cancellation of a distribution agreement without notice violated the New York Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Law, a public regulation. The federal court ruled that New York statute was 
applicable to breweries that "sell or offer to sell beer" in New York State. Relying upon U.C.C. 
§ 2-401, the federal court ruled that the New York wholesale had no cause of action under the 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Law because all sales between the New York wholesaler and the 
Russian brewery took place at the point of shipment in Russia. 
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As a rule of statutory construction, the Legislature is presumed to know of other statutes 
in existence at the time a given statute was passed. Folsom, 139 Idaho at 630, 279 P .2d at 630. 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. had already been enacted when the Legislature passed the 
Complementary Act. The Legislature intended the Complementary Act to only regulate 
cigarettes "for sale in this state." If the Legislature intended the phrase "for sale in this state" to 
have a different meaning than that given by LC. § 28-2-401, then the phrase would have been 
defined, as other words and phrases have been defined, in LC. § 39-8402. Absent a contrary 
definition, the Court should give the usual and common place meaning to phrase "for sale in this 
state" and conclude that Maybee's delivery sales do not take place in this State. 
ii. Maybee cannot be iudiciatlv estoeped from asserting that 
his sales take place outside ofldaho. 
In the support of its motion for summary judgment, the State offered as evidence an out 
of context statement from an affidavit signed and filed by Maybee in another, unrelated lawsuit 
in New York. (COE# 3, Ex. B). See Day Wholesale, Inc. v. State of New York, 51 A.D.3d 383, 
856 N.Y.S.2d 808 (2008). Maybee and a New York wholesaler (the "Plaintiffs") commenced 
the action in Day to obtain an order declaring that a 2005 amendment to the New York Tax Law 
("2005 Amendment") had not gone into effect and enjoining New York and its Attorney General 
from enforcing the amendment prior to its effective date. Id. at 384, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 808. The 
2005 Amendment required New York wholesalers to affix New York tax stamps on all cigarettes 
sold at wholesale on Indian reservations located within New York. Id. at 386, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 
809. The Plaintiffs argued that the 2005 Amendment had not gone into effect because the Tax 
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Department had not taken the necessary administrative steps to implement the legislative 
scheme, including the issuance of tax-exemption coupons. Id. The Plaintiffs were successful in 
obtaining a preliminary injunction. Id. 
Maybee signed and submitted an affidavit in support of the Plaintiffs' motion for 
preliminary injunction. In his affidavit, Maybee stated: 
Approximately 75% of my retail sales are to out-of-state purchasers. These sales 
are completed in the home state of the purchaser once their orders have been 
delivered through the mails. U.C.C. § 2-401. These out-of-state shipments are 
not intended for resale in the purchaser's home state, but are retail sales intended 
for the purchaser's personal use and consumption. Under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, these out-of-state purchasers 
are exempt from the imposition of New York sales and excise taxes since both the 
sale and use take place outside of the State. Accord 20 N.Y.C.C.R. § 76.3. 
(COE# 3, Ex. B i]9). The first and third sentences of this statement are factual allegations made 
by Maybee based on his own personal knowledge. The statements citing legal authority in the 
second and last sentences, however, are legal conclusions based on an erroneous opinion given to 
Maybee by his attorney. (COE #7 ill 6). 
The State offered Maybee's New York affidavit as "evidence of his understanding that 
title transfers in Idaho." (COE #8 at p. 8). The State also speculated that "this statement was 
apparently made to assist [Maybee] in avoiding the imposition or payment of New York taxes." 
(Id.) The District Court accepted as fact the State's unsupported assertions that Maybee's 
statement was made "to avoid the payment of New York State taxes on his sales." (R. 71). The 
court also found Maybee's "admission" to be "most telling." (R. 45). The District Court held 
that Maybee was "judicially estopped from asserting here that all of his sales take place on the 
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Seneca reservation" and later reaffirmed its findings that "Maybee's sales take place in Idaho." 
(R. 45, 71). 
Maybee made the statement to show that his sales to "out-of-state purchasers are exempt 
from the imposition of New York sales and excise taxes" under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
As a matter oflaw, this statement is true, but not because these sales take place in the home state 
of the purchasers, but because New York does not have jurisdiction to tax "out-of-state 
purchasers" who are not in New York at time of the sale. In re State Tax on Foreign-Held Bond, 
82 U.S. 300, 319 (1872) ("The power of taxation, however vast in its character and searching in 
its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the State.") In order words, 
a state cannot tax a good sold in interstate commerce if the person or entity obligated to pay the 
tax does not have a nexus to the taxing state. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 
274, 279 (1977). Maybee's statement, therefore, was not made "to avoid the payment of New 
York State taxes on his sales" because New York taxes do not apply to delivery sales made to 
out-of-state purchasers. For these same reasons, the State has acknowledged that it does not 
collect cigarette taxes on tobacco products sold in interstate commerce. (COE #7, Ex. D ,J35). 
Consequently, Idaho delivery sellers would not be required to affix Idaho tax stamps on 
cigarettes shipped to New York residents. IDAPA 35.01.10.013; IDAPA 35.01.10.022. 
The State claims that Maybee's statement is "evidence of his understanding" that sales 
.are completed in the home state of the purchaser. (COE #8 at p. 8). Maybee's understanding as 
to the situs of sale is not controlling; it is the understanding between the parties to the sale, which 
is controlling. In reviewing his statement, Maybee does not claim that the sales take place in the 
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purchaser's home state because of an explicit agreement with the purchaser. As the District 
Court noted in its first Memorandum Decision and Order, "[n]o 'contract' appears in the record." 
(R. 44). When a seller is authorized to ship the goods to the buyer, but the seller is not required 
to personally deliver the goods to the buyer, the sale is completed when the goods are given to a 
common carrier or the U.S. Postal Service. LC. § 28-2-401(2)(a). The District Court and the 
State did not dispute this interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-401. Instead, both the District Court and 
the State expressed doubts as to its applicability to public regulations such as the Complementary 
Act. (R. at 44-45, 71; COE #8 at pp 4~6).5 
Ironically, the District Court found Maybee's eJToneous interpretation of the U.C.C. to be 
more "telling" than the coJTect interpretation. Despite undisputed evidence to the contrary, the 
District Court found that "Maybee's sales take place in Idaho." The court reached this 
conclusion by misapplying the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 
This Court adopted the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church, 76 
Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954). In Loomis, this Court held that a litigant who obtains a 
judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party through means of a sworn statement is 
judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, to obtain a 
recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. 
Id. at 93-94, 277 P.2d at 565. Judicial estoppel "precludes a party from gaining an advantage by 
taking one position, and then seeking a second adva_ntage by taking an incompatible position." 
McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997) (quoting Rissetto v. 
5 Previously discussed on pages 28 through 33 of this brief. 
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Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1996)0. When appropriately 
applied, judicial estoppel promotes the orderly administration of justice and regard for the 
dignity of judicial proceedings. Id. (citing Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 601). Judicial estoppel prevents 
litigants from playing fast and loose with the courts. Id. 
The extraordinary remedy of judicial estoppel has only been cautiously applied under 
exceptional circumstances. A court may only invoke this remedy when a prior sworn statement 
(I) made deliberately by an litigant, without mistake, fraud or duress, and (2) from which the 
litigant obtained a judgment, advantage, or consideration in the prior proceeding, (3) is now 
repudiated by the litigant in a subsequent proceeding (4) arising out of the same transaction or 
subject matter. Loomis, 93-94, 277 P.2d at 565; McKay, 130 Idaho at 152-53, 937 P.2d at 1226-
27; Heinze v. Baurer, 145 Idaho 232, _, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008). These conditions ensure a 
tight fit between the party's earlier success gained by a prior sworn statement and the success 
sought to be gained by a later inconsistent statement, such that an inequity arises. None of these 
conditions are present in this case. 
As this Court recently stated in Heinze, judicial estoppel does not apply to a litigant who 
wishes to repudiate a position inadvertently made due to a mistake. Id. at _, 178 P .3d at 600 
(citing McKay. 130 Idaho at 153,937 P.2d at 1227). 
For guidance purposes and to avoid misapplication of judicial estoppel, it should 
be made clear that the concept should only be applied when the party maintaining 
the inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable with, full knowledge 
of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another way, 
the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states 
under oath in open court, but also what that pai;ty knew, or should have known, at 
the time the original position was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that the party 
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possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is 
determinative as to whether that person is "playing fast and loose" with the court. 
Id. at_, 178 P.3d at 600-01 (citing McKay, 130 Idaho at 155, 937 P.2d at 1229). Cf. A&J 
Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 687, 116 P.3d 12, 17 (2005) ("[F]ollowing the advice of 
counsel is not equivalent to inadvertence or mistake" if it appears to have been a strategic 
decision made in preparation of a petition in the prior proceeding.). In this case, Maybee 
inadvertently made his prior inconsistent statement based on an erroneous legal opinion given to 
him by his attorney, which gave him no strategic advantage in the prior case. (COE #7 i\16). 
Consequently, he should not be judicially estopped from correcting this legal mistake. 
Maybee is not attorney and, therefore, must rely upon the legal advice and opinions given 
to him by his attorneys. (COE #7 i\16). His statement that his sales take place in the purchaser's 
home state was not intended to be a factual allegation, but a legal conclusion to which he cited 
legal authority. (COE #3, Ex. B i\9). In a motion for summary judgment, "legal conclusions 
( especially by laymen)" are not factual statements based on the affiant' s personal knowledge and 
should not be considered for purposes of summary judgment. Tri-State National Bank v. 
Western Gateway Storage Co., 92 Idaho 543, 547, 447 P.2d 409, 413 (1968); 2A C.J.S. 
Affidavits § 64 ("Statements which constitute the opinion or belief of the affiant, or matters 
outside the personal knowledge of the affiant, are not 'competent evidence."'); 2A C.J.S. 
Affidavits § 39 ("It is improper for affidavits to embody legal arguments, and legal arguments 
and summations in affidavits will be disregarded by the courts."). Moreover, Maybee's legal 
opinion does not alter the undisputed facts of this case. Maybee accepts and fills orders from 
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Idaho consumers without leaving his place of business on the Seneca Nation Allegany Indian 
Territory. His last act is to deliver these unstamped cigarettes -- outside of Idaho -- to the United 
States Postal Service. These undisputed facts should control the outcome of the case - not an 
erroneous legal conclusion given to Maybee by his attorney. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that Maybee should have ]mown whether his 
statement was legally accurate prior to adopting it as part of his New York affidavit, the 
statement was not a factor that contributed to his success in ·the New York litigation. Every 
reported Idaho case that has invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppels has only permitted its 
application when the "judgment, advantage, or consideration" was obtained because of the prior 
sworn statement. See,~, Loomis, 76 Idaho at 93, 277 P.2d at 564-65 (an injured passenger 
received a settlement from a truck driver after claiming that her driver was free of any fault, but 
then sued her driver claiming that he went through a stop sign); Jensen v. U.S. Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 78 Idaho 145, 149,298 P.2d 976, 978-79 (1956) (fanner, who obtained a default 
judgment against a warehouse claiming that his delivery of wheat constituted a sale, was 
estopped from claiming that the delivery was a bailment so as to collect on the warehouse's 
surety bond); McKay, 130 Idaho at 155, 937 P.2d at 1230 (in a proceeding to approval an infant 
settlement, a mother told the court that she understood and consented to the settlement and was 
later estopped from claiming that the case was settled without her consent); Wood, l 41 Idaho at 
687, 116 P.3d at 17 (real estate speculator was judicial estopped from pursuing a claim against a 
joint venture after failing to list the claim as an asset in his bankruptcy petition); Heinze, 145 
Idaho at _, 178 P .3d at 600 (husband who told a divorce court that he was prepared to accept 
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the terms of a divorce settlement could not sue his attorney for legal malpractice because he was 
unhappy with some of its provisions). 
Maybee's sworn statement made no difference to the outcome of the New York litigation, 
which is not only evident from the decision issued in Day, but also from the fact that the trial 
court in Day allowed the statement to be expunged from the record and allowed a new affidavit 
to be filed nunc pro tune. Accord Day, 51 A.D.3d 383, 856 N.Y.S.2d 808; (see also, COE #13, 
Ex. 2). In its Order, the trial court in Day specifically stated that it found: 
no substantial rights of any party [was] affected by the granting of the Plaintiffs' 
motion and that the two sentences being removed from paragraph 9 of the 2006 
Affidavit did not form a basis for any of the Court's previous rulings or orders in 
this case .... 
(COE #13, Ex. 2). 
Finally, judicial estoppel applies only when a prior sworn statement is sought to be used 
in a subsequent proceedings arising out of the same transaction or subject matter as the prior 
proceeding. Loomis, 93-94, 277 P.2d at 565. The transactions at issue and subject matter in this 
case have no relationship to the transaction or subject matter of the Day case. This action 
involves the applicable of the Complementary Act to retail delivery sales made in interstate 
commerce to Idaho consumers. Day involved whether amendments to New York Tax Law 
affecting a wholesale transaction made in New York State had gone into effect. Since Maybee's 
prior statement did not involve the same transaction or subject matter, the District Court 
misapplied the doctrine of judicial estoppel in granting the State's motion for summary 
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judgment. As the undisputed facts of this case show, Maybee's delivery sales take place outside 
ofldaho. 
d. Maybee only sells cigarettes for a consumer's personal use and 
consumption. 
The undisputed evidence also shows that Maybee has only sold cigarettes to Idaho 
consumers for their personal use and consumption. Idaho consumers who possess unstamped 
cigarettes for their own personal use and consumption are not subject to the regulations imposed 
by the MSA Act or the Complementary Act. See I.C. § 39-7803; I.C. § 39-8403. If the 
Legislature intended to restrict Idaho consumers from purchasing unstamped cigarettes not listed 
on the Directory in interstate commerce, it could have easily accomplished this objective. By 
removing the phrase "for sale," § 39-8403(3)(b) of the Complementary Act would have simply 
stated that no person may "sell, offer, or possess in this state, cigarettes" not listed on the 
Directory. Instead, the Complementary Act only makes it unlawful for a person to "possess for 
sale in this state" cigarettes not listed on the Directory. l.C. § 39-8403(3)(b). 
The Complementary Act only prohibits Maybee from "introduc[ing] non-compliant 
, tobacco into the State" when he "knows or should know" these cigarettes are intended for 
distribution or sale in the State. l.C. § 39-8403(3)(c). In other words, an out-of-state delivery 
seller may be held liable under the Complementary Act if the seller knows or should know that 
the consumer will re-distribute or re-sell the non-compliant cigarettes in the state (i.e., intrastate). 
The undisputed facts in this case show that Maybee only sells cigarettes to consumers for their 
personal use and consumption. (COE #6 iP 7; COE #9, Ex. J at !DAG 142978). Since Maybee 
Boise-215497.1 0036346-()()002 43 
does not sell cigarettes that are intended for distribution or sale in the State, he cannot be found 
in violation of the Complementary Act. 
3. The Complementary Act Regulates Intrastate Delivery Sales. 
Maybee does not claim that the MSA Act and the Complementary Act apply only to face-
to-face sales, but not to delivery sales. On the contrary, the MSA Act and the Complementary 
Act applies lo. all intrastate sales, including both intrastate face-to-face sales and intrastate 
delivery sales. 
While conceding that the MSA Act is inapplicable to interstate delivery sales, the State 
asserts that the Legislature intended all delivery sales "to be subject to and in compliance with all 
regulation of tobacco sales that exist for the more traditional ways in which tobacco products are 
sold." (COE #8 at pp. 7, 23). We assume that the phrase "more traditional ways in which 
tobacco products are sold" means face-to-face sales. To support its contention, the State cites to 
a provision in the Minors' Access Act. (COE #8 at p. 7). 
Section 39-5714 (2) of the Minors' Access Act provides that a delivery sale must comply 
with certain specific provisions within that act, as well as: 
all other laws of the state of Idaho generally applicable to sales of tobacco 
products that occur entirely within Idaho including, but not limited to, those 
laws imposing excise taxes, sales and use taxes, licensing and tax stamping 
requirements and escrow or other payment obligations. 
(Emphasis added). If interstate sellers were subject to the same rules as intrastate seller, then 
interstate sellers would be required to sell only stamped cigarettes. See LC. § 63-2508. To 
render such an interpretation, the Court would have to ignore other applicable federal and state 
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laws. See,~, Quill, 504 U.S. at 314; l.C. § 63-2512(b); IDAPA 35.01.10.013; IDAPA 
35.01.10.022. 
If cigarettes sold in interstate commerce are to be subject to the same laws as those sold 
in intrastate commerce, then why does the State concede that unstamped cigarettes lawfully sold 
in interstate commerce do not trigger to the application of the MSA Act? In enacting the MSA 
Act, the Legislature specifically excludes unstamped cigarettes from the definition of "units 
sold." Since non-participating manufacturers are only required to make escrow payments based 
on the number of "units sold" in the State, Maybee's interstate delivery sales, as the State has 
already conceded, do not trigger the application of the MSA Act. (COE# 8 at p. 23). 
The State relies on § 39-5714(2) of the Minors' Access Act to support its unsupportable 
claim that the Complementary Act regulates interstate delivery sales. To accomplish its desired 
objective, the State completely ignores the plain language of the Complementary Act. For 
example, the Complementary Act, has 18 references to the MSA Act and no reference to the 
Minors' Access Act. The Complementary Act specifically states that it was enacted to prevent 
violations of the MSA Act and should be harmonized with the MSA Act with any conflict 
between the two statutes to be controlled by the provisions of the MSA Act. 
Since the State concedes that the MSA Act does not apply to interstate sales of 
unstamped cigarettes, then the Court must find a way to harmonize the provisions of the 
. Complementary Act and the Minors' Access Act with the provisions of the MSA Act. The most 
logical interpretation of§ 5714(2) of the Minors' Access Act would be that all intrastate delivery 
sales are subject to the same laws that are "generally applicable to sales of tobacco products that 
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occur entirely within Idaho" in the "more traditional" intrastate face-to-face sales. In other 
words, intrastate delivery sales are subject to the same laws and regulations as intrastate face-to-
foce sales. 
4. The Court Must Construe the Complementary Act in a Manner that 
Upholds its Constitutionality. 
Another maxim of statutory construction is that "any doubt concemmg [the] 
interpretation of a statute is to be resolved in favor of that which will render the statute 
constitutional." McLean, 142 Idaho at 814, 135 P.3d at 760. The Court, therefore, must reject 
any interpretation that suggests the Legislature acted in excess of its constitutional authority. 
In Barilka Brewers, a federal court was called upon to interpret the phrase "in this state" 
as used in the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. 443 F. Supp.2d at 318. The New 
York statute required that all beer sold or delivered in New York State by a brewer to a 
wholesaler must be' sold pursuant to a written franchise agreement. Id. at 321. The court was 
called upon to interpret a provision, which defined "brewers" subject to the New York statute, as 
"any person or entity engaged primarily in business as a brewer, manufacturer of alcoholic 
beverages, importer, marketer, broker or agent of any of the foregoing who sells or offers to sell 
beer to a beer wholesaler in this state or any successor to a brewer." Id. at 318. 
The New York wholesaler claimed that a Russian brewery was subject to the statute 
because it sold beer "to a beer wholesaler in this state." Id. at 318. The Russian brewery, on the 
other hand, interpreted the New York statute to apply only to a brewery that "sells or offers to 
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sell beer ... in this state." Id. The court initially found both interpretations to be reasonable and 
thus the language to be ambiguous. Id. at 318-19. 
In resolving the interpretation of the disputed text, the federal district court in Baltika 
observed that: 
statutory construction is a "holistic endeavor." United Sav'n Ass'n of Texas v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365 ... (1988) (Scalia, J.). Indeed, "a 
provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder 
of the statutory scheme-because the same tenninology is used elsewhere that 
makes its meaning clear ... " (Id.). When taking a holistic approach Courts must 
give every word meaning-statutory construction should not render some of the 
text superfluous. (Citation omitted). Moreover, a Court should not reach an 
interpretive result that is absurd. 
443 F.Supp. 2d at 319. The court was, therefore, careful not to render an interpretation that 
would raise "the specter of unconstitutionality." Id. at 319-320; accord McLean, 142 Idaho at 
814, 135 P.3d at 760. Consequently, it rejected the interpretation that the New York statute was 
intended to apply to "any transaction anywhere in the world with a licensed New York 
wholesaler." Id. at 319. 
A state's power to take action impacting interstate commerce is limited. Id. "The 
'Commerce Clause ... precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place 
wholly outside of the State's borders whether or not the commerce has effects within the State."' 
Id. at 319-320 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324,336 (1989) and Edgar v. MITE Corp., 
457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982)). The court, therefore, concluded that the "only sensible 
interpretation" to the New York statute is to limit its application to a brewery that "sells or offers 
to sell beer ... in this state." Id. at 320. After rendering this interpretation, the court held that 
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the New York statute was inapplicable to the "sales and deliveries" made by the Russian brewery 
since such "sales and deliveries" take place at the point of shipment in Russia under U.C.C. § 2-
401. Id. at 322. 
In this case, the State asserts that Maybee cannot provide to Idaho consumers cigarettes 
not listed on the Directory, even if he sells, offer for sale and ships those cigarettes outside of 
Idaho. The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of this interpretation would control 
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State. Id. at 320 (quoting Healy. 491 U.S. at 336). Since 
the Complementary Act cannot be given an interpretation that would run afoul of the donnant 
Commerce Clause, the Court must find that it is only unlawful for a person to "sell, offer, or 
possess" cigarettes not listed on the Directory "for sale in this state." Guided by these 
constitutional principles and by Idaho Code § 28-2-401(2)(a), this Court should conclude that 
Maybee's delivery sales take place outside of Idaho and are not regulated by the Complementary 
Act. 
B. The State is Preempted by the Indian Commerce Clause from Enforcing the 
Provisions of the Complementary Act Against an Native American Delivery 
Seller. 
If, as the District Court found, "Maybee's compliance with the [Complementary Act] is 
not dependent upon where the sale takes place, but is dependent only upon the taking of the 
delivery sale order," then the Complementary Act seeks to regulate Maybee's on-reservation 
acceptance of a delivery sale order. (R. 72). This assertion of state authority over on-reservation 
conduct automatically raises the issue of federal preemption under the Indian Commerce Clause 
of the United States Constitution. 
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Under the Indian Commerce Clause, Congress has been given plenary power to regulate 
the affairs of Indians. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192. Since Congress is vested only with 
this power, state law historically has had "no role to play" within reservation boundaries. 
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 101 (2005); McClanahan v. Arizona 
Tax Comm'n, 41 l U.S. 164, 168 (1973) ("[t]he policy of leaving Indian free from state 
jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history."). Questions of pre-emption in 
the area of Indian jurisprudence, therefore, are not resolved by reference to standards that have 
developed in other areas of the Jaw. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176. 
Although Congress has "acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have no 
power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation," pre-emption based on the Indian 
Commerce Clause is "not limited to cases in which Congress has expressly - as compared to 
impliedly-pre-empted the state activity." McCJanahan, 41 l U.S at 175 fnl3; Cotton Petroleum, 
490 U.S. at 176-77. To safeguard Congress' latent powers from state encroachment, "[s)tate 
laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where 
Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply." McC!anahan, 411 U.S at 170-71. 
Indian jurisprudence cases, however, "have not established an inflexible per se rule." 
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214-15. Instead, the United States Supreme Court has applied a flexible 
pre-emption analysis, known as the Bracker interest-balancing test, which "requires a 
particularized examination of the relevant state, federal and tribal interests." Bracker, 448 U.S. 
at 143 (citing Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 
832, 838 (I 982)). While state interests must be given weight, the pre-emption analysis requires, 
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as a rule, any ambiguities to be resolved in favor of tribal independence. Cotton Petroleum, 490 
U.S. at 177. 
The analysis begins with two questions that "have significant consequences" relating to 
pre-emption -- "who" is being regulated and "where" does the conduct being regulated take 
place. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at I 01. With regards to the "where," the Supreme Court has stated that 
"though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in , 
determining whether state authority has exceeded the permissible limits." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 
151. The Wagnon who/where test, as summarized in the table below, encapsulates prior United 
States Supreme Court precedents challenging the exercise of state civil regulatory authority over 
Indians or Indian reservations: 
STATE AUTHORITY OVER "The Where" 
"The Who" On-reservation activities Off-reservation activities 
When on-reservation conduct Absent express federal law 
involving only Indians is at to the contrary, Indians 
issue, state laws are generally physically going beyond 
Indians inapplicable, absent express reservation boundaries have 
congressional authority. The generally been held subject 
state's regulatory interest is to non-discriminatory state 
likely to be minimal and the law.7 
federal interest in encouraging 
tribal self-fovernment is at its 
strongest. 
6 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (state could not impose personal property tax in the absence of 
congressional consent); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U,S. 202 (1987) (state could prohibit a 
tribe from operating a high-stake bingo enterprise on tribal land); Mcclanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 
164 (1973) (state could not impose income tax on income earned on the reservation by a tribal member); Moe v. 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (state could impose cigarette 
taxes on sales made between tribal members; state could not impose a retail license requirement on a tribal 
business); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (Congress permitted states to impose liquor licenses on tribal 
businesses); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (state cannot impose motor fuel tax 
on tribal businesses). 
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ST A TE AUTHORITY OVER "The Where" 
"The Who" On-reservation activities Off-reservation activities 
The most difficult questions Consistent with its 
arise where a state asserts traditional police powers, a 
authority over on-reservation state has the authority to 
Non-Indians conduct of non-Indians. In regulate the off-reservation 
these instances, a state must conduct of non-Indians that 
have a significant regulatory takes place within its state.9 
interest that outweig:hs federal 
and tribal interests. 
With regards to the "who" and the "where," the pre-emption analysis starts with a "fair 
interpretation" of the statute, "as written and applied." Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 103. 
7 New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Baker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916) (Indian are subject to state laws regarding off-
reservation fishing); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,4 l l U.S. 145 (1973) (state could impose a gross receipt tax 
on off-reservation ski resort operated by a tribe); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (state had the authority to 
conduct an on-reservation investigation relating to off-reservation crimes); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw 
Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (state could impose income tax on income earned off the reservation); Organized 
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (I 962) (Indians are subject to state laws regarding off-reservation fishing); 
Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game Wash., 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (same); Tu!ee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) 
(Indians are subject to state laws relating to off-reservation fishing, but are not subject to state fishing licenses); 
Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) (Indians are subject to state laws regarding off-reservation hunting). 
' Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (state cannot impose severance tax imposed on a 
non-Indian oil and gas producer); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 
U.S. 463 (1976) (state can impose a minimum burden on tribal business to collect cigarette taxes on sale to non-
Indians); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (state hunting and fishing laws do not apply 
non-tribal members who hunt and fish on an Indian reservation); Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of 
Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (state could not impose a gross receipt tax on a non-Indian contractor 
that constructed a reservation school funded by the federal government); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax 
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (state could not impose a tax on Indian traders); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (state could not impose tax on non-Indian logging company); Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217 (1959) (state courts lack jurisdiction to hear claims between a non-Indian and Indian involving on-
reservation transactions). · 
9 Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (state could impose tax on the off-reservation 
receipt of motor fuel by on a non-Indian motor fuel distributor). 
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1. The State Seeks Only to Regulate the On-Reservation Conduct of an Out-of-
State Native American. 
There are four entities that facilitate a tobacco delivery sale: (1) the tobacco 
manufacturer or distributor who supplies tobacco products to the delivery seller; (2) the delivery 
seller who sells, offers or possesses tobacco products for sale; (3) the customer who purchases 
tobacco products; and (4) the delivery service that transports the tobacco products from the 
delivery seller to the customer. In this case, the State seeks to assert authority over the on-
reservation conduct that involves only Maybee, an enrolled tribal member. Absent express 
congressional authority, state laws are generally inapplicable "when on-reservation conduct 
involving only Indians is at issue." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144. Except for Maybee, the State does 
not claim that the Complementary Act regulates any other entities facilitating a delivery sale in 
interstate commerce. 
The scope of the Complementary Act is limited to "cigarettes sold in this state" by a 
tobacco manufacturer or any "wholesaler, distributor, retailer or similar intennediary or 
intermediaries." See generally, I.C. § 39-8403. Idaho tax stamps are only required to be affixed 
on cigarettes sold at retail in intrastate commerce. LC. § 63-2508. Idaho tax stamps, however, 
are not affixed to cigarettes sold in interstate commerce. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314; LC. § 63-
2512(b); IDAPA 35.01.10.013; IDAPA 35.01.10.022. Limited by the definition of"units sold," 
tobacco manufacturers are only subject to the provisions of the MSA Act and the 
Complementary Act if their cigarettes are stamped and sold in this State. LC. § 39-8403(!). 
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Consequently, the State must concede that Maybee's interstate sales of unstamped cigarettes do 
not trigger any obligation of a tobacco manufacturer under the Complementary Act. 
"[U]nder ce1iain circumstances, a State may validly assert authority over the activities of 
nonmembers on a reservation .... " Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214-15 (emphasis added). Although 
Maybee sells to Idaho consumers, the Complementary Act does not regulate the conduct of 
consumers. Idaho consumers may "acquire, hold, own, possess, transport, import, or cause to be 
imported cigarettes" not listed on the Directory for their own personal use and consumption. The 
Complementary Act only makes it unlawful for a person to knowing! y distribute or sell non-
compliant cigarettes in the State. LC. § 39-8403(3)(c). Since Idaho consumers acquire these 
cigarettes from Maybee for their personal use and consumption and not for resale or distribution, 
the Complementary Act does not regulate their conduct. Id. The Complementary Act, therefore, 
does not purport to "assert authority over the activities of nonmembers [ who purchase non-
compliant cigarettes sold, offered and possessed for sale] on a reservation." Accord Cabazon, 
480 U.S. at 214-15. 
The State also lacks the authority to regulate the activities of the United States Postal 
Services or common carriers that transport cigarettes in interstate commerce. Johnson v. 
Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (I 920); Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n, _U.S._, 128 
S. Ct. 989 (2008). In Johnson, Justice Holmes finnly established that states have no power to 
control the instrumentalities of the United States through state laws that would regulate an 
employee of the United States Postal Services in the performance of his official duties. 254 U.S. 
at 57. In Rowe, the United States Supreme Court recently held that Congress, in enacting the 
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Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, pre-empted states from imposing liability, 
based on constructive knowledge, on a common carrier that transported packages containing 
contraband tobacco. 128 S. Ct. at 996. Rowe further held that states cannot impose regulations 
on a common carrier that might affect its rates, route or service, even if such state regulations 
relate to tobacco and are in furtherance of public health. Id. at 998. Consequently, the 
provisions of the Complementary Act are inapplicable to activities conducted by the U.S. Postal 
Services or a common carrier. 
The conduct at issue in this case, therefore, involves only Maybee, an enrolled tribal 
member who makes delivery sales without leaving his place of business on an out-of-state Indian 
reservation. Absent express congressional authority, the State has the burden to show that 
Maybee's on-reservation conduct has off-reservation effects that impairs a significant state 
interest sought to be protected by the Complementary Act. Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 336. The 
State, as a matter oflaw, has not met its constitutional burden. 
2. The State Cannot Show An Off-Reservation Effect that Impairs a 
Significant Interest Warranting State Regulation or Intervention. 
Before the District Court, the State argued that Maybee's conduct triggers the application 
of the Complementary Act when he "introduces noncompliant tobacco into the State" by mailing 
them to Idaho consumers. (COE #8 at pp. 10, 13). The State mischaracterized this conduct as 
"off-reservation activity" even though Maybee never leaves his reservation during any stage of 
the sale transaction. (COE #6 iJ25). Consumer orders and payments are received by Maybee at 
his place of business on the reservation. (Id. iJ24). Orders are filled and mailed from the 
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reservation. (Id. '1[25). The State has no authority to regulate mail being delivered into the State, 
but claims to have authority to "limit [Maybee's] ability to introduce non-compliant tobacco into 
the State." (COE #8 at p. 13). The State, therefore, seeks to prevent Maybee from mailing 
cigarettes not listed on the Directory to Idaho consumers - an on-reservation activity. 
The State has failed to allege or to show that Maybee's on-reservation conduct has off-
reservation effects that impair a significant interest intended to be protected by the 
Complementary Act. As we have repeatedly stated, the Legislature enacted the Complementary 
Act as a "procedural enhancement" to the enforcement of the MSA Act. LC. § 39-840 !. The 
Legislature intended the MSA Act and the Complementary Act to protect "the integrity of 
Idaho's master settlement agreement with leading tobacco product manufacturers, the fiscal 
soundness of the state, and the public health." Compare LC. § 39-8401 with LC. 39-7801. 
Maybee's on-reservation conduct does not threaten any of these interests. 
The primary goal of the Complementary Act is to prevent violations of the MSA Act. 
LC. § 39-8401. The MSA Act imposes obligation only on "tobacco manufacturers selling 
cigarettes to consumers within the state."10 I.C. § 39-7803. Since Maybee is not a tobacco 
manufacturer, any conduct on his part would not violate the provisions of the MSA Act. More 
importantly, the State has conceded that Maybee's sale of unstamped cigarettes does not affect 
the escrow obligations of non-participating tobacco manufacturers under the MSA Act. (COE #8 
at p. 23). Although Maybee's on-reservation conduct has the off-reservation effect of 
" Citing to a section that has been repealed, the District Court mistakenly asserted that the MSA Act imposes 
obligations on wholesalers, distributors and stamping agents. (R. 41 ). Sections 39-7804 and 39-7805 of the MSA 
Act were repealed after the Legislature enacted the Complementary Act. The MSA Act only imposes obligations on 
tobacco manufacturers. 
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"introduc[ing] ... in the State" cigarettes not listed on the Directory, this off-reservation effect 
causes no violation to the MSA Act. 
The State also failed to show how Maybee' s conduct has the effect of threatening "the 
integrity" of the Master Settlement Agreement with leading tobacco manufacturers. Under the 
terms of the Master Settlement Agreement, Idaho is obligated to diligently enforce its MSA Act. 
Since non-participating manufacturers are not obligated to make escrow payments based on 
Maybee's sales, the State cannot claim that Maybee's sales affect its ability to diligently enforce 
the MSA Act, as required by the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement. Additionally, the 
State has failed to show or allege that Maybee's conduct has any effect on the "integrity" or 
obligations of the settling parties to the Master Settlement Agreement. 
The MSA Act was enacted to "effectively and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantage that 
Participating Manufacturers experience vis-a-vis Non-Participating Manufacturers within such 
Settling States as a result of the provisions" of the Master Settlement Agreement. (COE #7, Ex. 
D 133). By selling brands manufactured by non-participating manufacturers, Maybee's sales 
may have the off-reservation effect of reducing sales of brands manufactured by the participating 
manufacturer. As Philip Morris, the Nation's largest tobacco manufacturers, has observed, "a 
key distinction" between Native American delivery sellers and other delivery sellers is that 
Native American delivery sellers: 
use the Internet to gain a broad geographical reach for brands they manufacture. 
Some examples of Native American-manufactured brands include Seneca, Native 
and Skydancer. 
(COE #7, Ex.Fat IDAG139654). Even though Maybee has sold cigarettes manufactured by 
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Native Americans and other non-participating manufacturers to Idaho consumers, the State must 
show that this off-reservation effect impairs a significant state interest. Protecting private 
tobacco companies from competition is not a legitimate state interest and cannot be justified as 
the exercise of the State's police power relating to the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. 
Under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement, participating manufacturers are 
obligated "to pay substantial sums to the state (tied in part to their volume of sales)" in exchange 
for releases of past, present and certain future claims. I.C. § 39-7801(e). Arguably, Maybee's 
sales might displace brands sold by participating manufacturers, causing MSA payments made 
by these participating manufacturers to be reduced. But the State does not claim that this 
potential off-reservation effect threatens "the fiscal soundness of the state." As the State has 
conceded, "[w]hether Defendant's [alleged] illegal cigarette sales threaten Idaho's fiscal 
soundness is not at issue" in this case. (COE #8 at p. 24). 
In enacting the MSA Act, the Legislature found that: 
Cigarette smoking ... presents serious financial concerns for the state. Under 
certain health-care programs, the state may have a legal obligation to provide 
medical assistance to eligible persons for health conditions association with 
cigarette smoking .... 
I.C. § 39-7801. Despite these findings, neither the MSA Act nor the Complementary Act bans 
the sale or use of cigarettes in the State in furtherance of public health. 
Idaho and other states sought to have these "finaucial burdens imposed on the state by 
cigarette smoking borne by tobacco manufacturers, rather than by the state." LC.§ 39-780l(d). 
Of course, the State could have easily accomplished this objective by increasing the cigarette 
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excise tax on all cigarettes sold or used in the State. Instead, the State filed a lawsuit against the 
Nation's four largest tobacco companies that were responsible for 99.58350% of all cigarettes 
sold in the United States (i.e., Phillip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Lorillard and Brown & 
Williamson). Accord LC. § 39-780l(e); (COE #7, Ex.D "il"il 15, 27). On November 23, 1998, 
these leading manufacturers settled various lawsuits and obtained releases of past, present and 
certain claims alleging culpable conduct on the part of these manufacturers. These participating 
manufacturers also agreed to "pay substantial sums to the state" and, in exchange, the State 
agreed to enact and diligently enforce the MSA Act. 
Under the MSA Act, the non-participating manufacturers are obligated to make escrow 
payments based on the number of units sold in the State so that, "if they are proven to have acted 
culpably," the State may have a source of a recovery against these non-participating 
manufacturers in the future. LC.§ 39-780l(d), (f). The State has alleged no culpable conduct on 
the part of any non-participating manufacturers whose brands are not certified for sale in the 
State, but are sold by Maybee. More importantly, the United State Supreme Court has held that a 
state cannot speculate to possible or future off-reservation effects to sustain a claim that a state 
has regulatory authority over on-reservation conduct. See, Q&, Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 336; 
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 220-21 (1987). 
In Mescalero, New Mexico attempted to enforce state hunting and fishing laws against 
non-tribal members on tribal land. The Supreme Court stated that a "State's regulatory interest 
will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate 
state intervention." 462 U.S. at 336. Although that case involved the on-reservation conduct of 
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non-tribal members, the same standard can be used for on-reservation conduct of tribal members, 
which produces off-reservation effects. 
To justify the exercise of state authority, New Mexico claimed in Mescalero that it had an 
interest in the wildlife conservation and in the collection of state licensing fees. Id. at 342-43. 
New Mexico, however, conceded that on-reservation hunting by tribal and non-tribal members 
had no adverse impact on fish and wildlife outside the reservation. Id. at 342. New Mexico's 
"general desire to obtain revenue" from the collection of licensing fees was, in the Court's view, 
"inadequate to justify the assertion of concurrent jurisdiction" with the tribe. Id. at 343. Even 
though New Mexico could point to a potential off-reservation effect, the Court ruled that those 
possible effects were not sufficient to justify state intervention to regulate the on-reservation 
conduct of even non-tribal members. Id. at 342-343. 
In Cabazon, California's sole interest to justify the imposition of its state gaming laws on 
tribal gambling enterprises was the possibility that high stakes gaming might attract organized 
crime. 480 U.S. at 220-2 l. California did not allege "any present criminal involvement" with 
these tribal gambling enterprises. Id. at 22 l. The Supreme Court was unconvinced that such 
remote interests were "sufficient to escape the pre-emptive force of federal and tribal interests" 
implicated in that case. Id. 
In this case, the State has not alleged or presented any evidence that Native American or 
other non-participating manufacturers have engaged in any conduct from which they could be 
"found culpable by the courts." LC. § 39-780l(d). More importantly, both the MSA Act and the 
Complemei1tary Act only require non-participating; manufacturers to make escrow payment if 
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their cigarettes are sold in the State. Consequently, the State's "eventual source of recovery" 
from these non-participating manufacturers "if they are proven to have acted culpably,'' would 
not include escrow payments based on "units used" in the State, as opposed to "units sold in this 
state." Maybee's sales, therefore have no off-reservation effect that impairs any current or future 
interest sought to be protected by either the MSA Act or the Complementary Act. 
Finally, the State has not alleged or shown why the sale of "non-compliant" cigarettes 
threatens the public health any more than the sale of "compliant" cigarettes. Cigarette brands 
listed on the Directory are not Jess addictive or dangerous to smokers. Cigarettes are listed only 
because the manufacturer has filed with the Attorney General non-health related information on 
an annual certification. The State, therefore, cannot show that Maybee's on-reservation conduct 
has an off-reservation effect sought to be regulated by the Complementary Act. 
As a matter of Jaw, the District Court erred in granting the State's motion for summary 
judgment and in enjoining Maybee from selling or offering to sell cigarettes not listed on the 
Directory to Idaho consumers from his place of business on the Seneca Nation Allegany Indian 
Territory. For the reasons stated in Point I, we respectfully request that paragraphs 1, 3, 4, and 5 
of the Judgment entered against Maybee on February 26, 2006 be reversed and that the District 
Court be directed to dismiss the State's first cause of action in its complaint claiming violations 
of the Complementary Act. 
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POINT II 
THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE PREEMPTS THE 
MINORS' ACCESS ACT FROM IMPOSING A PERMIT 
ON A NATIVE AMERICAN DELIVERY SELLER 
In its second cause of action, the State alleges that Maybee has violated the Minors' 
Access Act by selling cigarettes at retail to Idaho consumers without first possessing the state 
tobacco permit. (R. 17-18 if45). Again we begin the pre-emption analysis with a "fair 
interpretation" of the relevant provisions of the Minors' Access Act, "as written and applied," to 
determine "who" is being regulated and "where" does the conduct being regulated take place. 
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 101,103. 
A. The State Seeks to Regulate On-Reservation Sales of A Native American 
Tobacco Seller By Requiring a Permit Prior to Malting A Delivery Sale. 
The Minors' Access Act provides that "(p]rior to making delivery sales or shipping 
tobacco products in connection with such sales," a delivery seller must obtain a state tobacco 
permit. LC.§ 39-5718(1). The Wagnon who/where test is easily answered by the statute's plain 
language. The permit requirement is imposed on a delivery seller "who," in this case, is Maybee, 
an enrolled tribal member. It further states that a permit must be obtained "[p]rior to making 
delivery sales or shipping tobacco products in connection with such sales." Id. Without a 
permit, a delivery seller cannot accept an order from or ship cigarettes to an Idaho consumer. Id. 
Since orders are received, accepted and mailed on the reservation, the permit requirement of the 
Minors' Access Act attempts to regulate Maybee's conduct on the reservation. 
The fact that the permit requirements apply to all tobacco retailers does not alter the pre-
Boise-215497.l 0036346-00002 61 
emption analysis. Non-discriminatory state Jaws can still be pre-empted if such Jaws assert 
authority over the on-reservation conduct involving only lndians. 11 Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144. 
"When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally 
inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in 
encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest." Id. For the State to overcome this strong 
presumption, it must show that Congress granted it civil regulatory authority over out-of-state 
reservation sellers who ship tobacco products to Idaho consumers or that it has a significant 
interest warranting state intervention. In this case, the State has shown neither. 
B. Congress Has Not Authorized the State to Regulate On-Reservation Tobacco 
Sales of an Out-of-State Native American. 
The State's police powers are generally presumed not to apply to on-reservation conduct 
of tribal members. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144. An act of Congress, however, can overcome this 
presumption by delegating civil regulatory authority to the State. See, ~, Rice v. Rehner, 463 
U.S. 713 (1983). 
1. State Liquor Laws Versus State Tobacco Laws. 
The District Court found that Maybee was required to obtain a state-issued permit prior to 
making a delivery sale to an Idaho consumer. (R. 47). It cited to Rice for support. (Id.). 
In Rice, the United States Supreme Court found that "Congress ha[ d] delegated authority 
to the States as well as to the Indian tribes to regulate the use and distribution of alcoholic 
beverages in Indian country .... " Id. at 715. By enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1161, Congress removed 
11 See cases cited in footnote 6. 
Boise-215497.1 0036346-00002 62 
the 1832 federal prohibition that made it illegal to give, distribute or sell alcohol to an Indian. Id. 
at 726. Section 1161 provides that liquor transactions must be "in conformity both with the laws 
of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the 
tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country .... " Id. at 715. The United States 
Supreme Court held that Congress intended state laws to govern tribal liquor transactions as long 
as the tribe itself approved such transactions by enacting an ordinance. Id. at 726. 
Although § 1 161 did not explicitly impose state licensing requirements on reservation 
sellers, the Rice Court ruled that Congress had authorized state liquor regulations that required a 
reservation business to obtain a state liquor license before selling alcohol to non-Indians for off-
premises consumption. Id. at 726. The Court, therefore, ruled that a reservation seller was 
required to obtain a California liquor license. 
In Rice, the United States Supreme Court observed that "in Indian matters, Congress 
usually acts 'upon the assumption that States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on 
a reservation.'" Id. at 723, quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). This assumption, 
as the Court further observed, is "unwarranted in the narrow context of the regulation of liquor." 
Id. at 723. 
[T]radition simply has not recognized sovereign immunity or inherent authority in 
favor of liquor regulation by Indians. The colonists regulated Indian liquor 
trading before this Nation was formed, and Congress exercised its authority over 
these transactions as early as 1802. 
Id. at 722. In short, the Rice holding has no applicability outside "the narrow context of 
regulation of liquor." 
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Unlike tobacco, Native Americans first acquired alcohol from European settlers. Felix S. 
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 352 (Government Printing Office 1948). Because 
alcohol was never introduced into Indian society until the arrival of the white settlers, Indians 
had no tolerance for alcohol. Id. Native Americans believe that consumption of alcohol allowed 
"spirits" to enter their bodies. Indian tribes at various times sought to curb the consumption of 
this "fatal poison." Id. The first federal law prohibiting the sale of alcohol to Indians was 
enacted, at least in part, in response to the verbal plea of an Indian chief to President Thomas 
Jefferson. Id. 
Tobacco, on the other hand, was introduced to European settlers by Native Americans. 
Historically, Native Americans used tobacco not only as a commodity of trade, but also for 
ceremonial purposes. The sharing of the peace pipe symbolized the accord reached between and 
among tribal nations, or between and among t.ribal nations and foreign governments in forming 
treaties and other alliances. Tradition has recognized the inherent authority oflndians to regulate 
tobacco. 
2. Federal Tobacco Laws. 
Unlike the regulation of alcohol, Congress has not authorized states to regulate tobacco 
sales on Indian reservation. In the last five years, several bills have been introduced into 
Congress that would expand the civil enforcement powers of states to regulate reservation 
tobacco sales. 12 Other congressional bills have been introduced to ban delivery sales by making 
12 See H.R. 1839, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) (entitled "Youth Smoking Prevention and State Revenue 
Enforcement Act"); S. 1177, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) (entitled "PACT Act'} H.R. 2824, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2003) (entitled "Internet Tobacco Sales Enforcement Act"); H.R. 3749, 108' Cong., 2"' Sess. (2004) (entitled 
Boise-215497.1 0036346-00002 64 
cigarettes and certain other tobacco products umnailable. 13 Congress has not passed any of these 
bills. 
In 2006, Congress amended the provisions of the Cigarette Contraband Trafficking Act 
("CCTA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2341 et seq. The amendments lowered the threshold definition for 
"contraband" for federal intervention and expanded civil enforcement of the CCT A to include 
state attorneys general and local governments. 18 U.S.C. § 2341 ( contraband threshold changed 
from 60,000 taxable, unstamped cigarettes to 10,000 taxable, unstamped cigarettes); 18 U.S.C. § 
2346(b)(I), (2) (civil enforcement expanded to allow state attorneys general and local 
government to seek injunctive relief and civil penalties against violators). Importantly, Congress 
did not pennit state attorneys general or local governments to seek civil enforcement against "an 
Indian tribe or an Indian in Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 2346(b)(l), (2). The amendments 
specifically stated that: 
[n]othing in this chapter shall be deemed to abrogate or constitute a waiver of any 
sovereign immunity of ... an Indian tribe against any unconsented lawsuit under 
this chapter, or otherwise to restrict, expand, or modify any sovereign immunity 
of ... an Indian tribe. 
18 U.S.C. § 2346(b)(2). These amendments demonstrate that Congress has not allowed states to 
exercise jurisdiction over tobacco sales conducted on Indian reservations. 
"Local Government Internet Tobacco Sales Enforcement Act of 2004"); S. 3810, 109th Cong., 2"' Sess. (2006) 
(entitled "PACT Act"); S. 1027, 110th Cong., !st Sess. (2007) (entitled "PACT Act"); H.R. 4081, I 10th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (2007) (entitled "PACT Act" and same as S. 1027). All congressional bills with summary, text and status are 
available online at http://www.govtrack.us/. 
13 See H.R. 2813, 109th Cong., I" Sess. (2005); H.R. 2932, 110th Cong., I" Sess. (2007); S. 1027, 110th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (2007) (entitled "PACT Act"); H.R. 4081, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (entitled "PACT Act" and same as S. 
1027). 
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Congress has given the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") the exclusive power and 
authority to make regulations, specifying the kind, quantity and price of goods that can be sold to 
Indians on an Indian reservation. 25 U.S.C. § 261. BIA, therefore, has the sole authority to 
regulate the sale, distribution and shipment of tobacco products to an Indian reservation. The 
United States Supreme Court has held that "Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on 
reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional burdens." 
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965). The Indian Trader 
Statutes, therefore, pre-empt any state law that would restrict the kind, quantity or price of 
tobacco products sold to an Indian tribe or its members. If every Settling State, by enacting a 
qualifying statute, attempted to restrict the kind, quantity, and price on cigarettes sold at 
wholesale on an Indian reservation, then such state laws would conflict with the exclusive 
authority given to the BIA under the Indian Trader Statutes. 
By examining Title 25 of the United States Code, the Court can observe "Congress' firm 
commitment to the encouragement of tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." 
Accord Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 334. 
Self-determination and economic development are not within reach if the Tribes 
cannot raise revenues and provide employment for their members. The Tribes' 
interests obviously parallel the federal interests. 
Cabazon, 480 at 219. Maybee's business creates revenue for his tribe and jobs on his 
reservation, thereby furthering tribal and federal interests of promoting self-sufficiency and 
economic development. 
In sum, Congress has shown that it is not supportive of expanding the State's civil 
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regulatory authority over tobacco sales from Indian reservations. First, Congress has granted the 
BIA exclusive power and authority over tobacco products that can be sold to an Indian 
reservation. Second, the CCTA amendments specifically preclude state enforcement on Indian 
reservations. Finally, Congress has rejected bills proposing the expansion of state authority over 
tobacco sales on Indian reservations. These facts are evidence of a federal policy that pre-empts 
the State from enforcing its civil tobacco laws on an out-of-state Indian reservation without 
specific federal legislation. 
C. Idaho Would Not Be the First State Pre-empted from Imposing a Permit or 
License on a Native American Tobacco Seller. 
Idaho is not the first state to have sought to impose a permit or licensing requirement on a 
reservation tobacco seller. A three-judge district court held that the State of Montana could not 
impose licensing requirement on a private Native American tobacco retailer. Confederated 
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 392 F. Supp. at 1312, affd, 425 U.S. 463, 480-481. In that case, 
deputy sheriffs arrested a member of a tribal nation for failing to possess a Montana cigarette 
retail license and for selling unstamped cigarettes. 425 U.S. at 467. Both the tribe and the tribal 
member sued the State of Montana challenging the applicability of the Montana cigarette tax and 
licensing statutes to tribal members who sell cigarettes from an Indian reservation. Id. at 467-
468. 
Montana conceded that it lacked the authority to tax sales between individual tribal 
members. Confederated Saiish and Kootenai Tribes, 392 F. Supp. at 1307 n. 18. Instead, 
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Montana asserted that it had the authority to impose a retail license if reservation sellers sold 
tobacco products at retail to non-Indians. 
The arrested tribal member sold tobacco products not only to members of his tribe, but 
also to non-Indians for their off-reservation use. 392 F. Supp. at 1311 ("It may reasonably be 
inferred that the stores were not established primarily for the benefit of Indian customers residing 
on the Reservation, but rather to sell cigarettes to prospective customers passing on the highway 
and others who come from neighboring communities to purchase cigarettes at a price 
substantially lower than the going price off the Reservation."). In an action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief, the federal district court ruled that a tribal member could not be compelled to 
obtain a state retail license. 392 F. Supp. at 1312. The United States Supreme Court affirmed 
this holding on the ground of federal pre-emption. 425 U.S. at 480-481. 
Maybee's delivery sales cannot be distinguished from the face-to-face sales made by the 
Native American smokeshop owner in Moe. Both conduct retail sales without leaving their 
reservations. Both sell tobacco products to non-Indian consumers for their off-reservation use. 
Neither is involved in the transporting of tobacco products off the reservation. In Moe, 
consumers transported the product off the reservation, and in this case, the United States Postal 
Service ships the product off the reservation. In Moe, the tribal retainer benefited from the state 
highways that pass by the reservation bringing off-reservation consumers to his smokeshop. In 
this case, Maybee benefits from the information superhighway (i.e. the Internet) that attracts 
consumers to his on-reservation business. 
Boise-215497.10036346-00002 68 
The State can only distinguish the facts in Moe from the facts in this case by showing that 
Maybee's delivery sales have off-reservation effects that did not exist in the face-to-face sales 
made by the smokeshop owner in Moe. Maybee asserts that his delivery sales have no off-
reservation effects that impair a significant state interest sought to be protected by the Minors' 
Access Act. In fact, Maybee can prove that his delivery sales further the State's interests, more 
than face-to-face sales. The State, therefore, cannot show any off-reservation effect that 
necessities state regulation or judicial intervention. 
D. Maybee's On-Reservation Delivery Sales Have No Off-Reservation Effects 
that Necessitate the Imposition of a Permit. 
The Legislature enacted the Minors' Access Act "to prevent the illegal sale, theft and 
easy access of tobacco products to minors and to prohibit the possession, distribution and use of 
tobacco products by minors." LC. § 39-5701. Under the Minors' Access Act, delivery sales are 
subject to certain state requirements. LC. § 39-5714. Maybee is only alleged to have violated 
one of these state requirements - selling tobacco product without a state tobacco pennit. The 
Minors' Access Act declares that the sale or distribution of tobacco products without a permit "is 
considered by the state of Idaho as an effort to subvert the state's public purpose to prevent 
minor's access to tobacco products." LC. § 39-5709. 
According to the State, "[t]he permit requirement contributes to the State's effort at 
controlling the ability of minors to obtain tobacco by ensuring that [the State] has a central 
repository of all businesses marketing tobacco to Idaho residents with a uniform set of data 
which facilitates compliance monitoring and, where necessary, enforcement actions." (COE # 8 
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at p. 18). Delivery sellers are required under the Minors' Access Act to "file with the state tax 
commission a statement setting forth the seller's name, trade name and the address of the 
business's principal place of business and any other place of business." LC.§ 39-5718(1). The 
Jenkins Act similarly requires an out-of-state delivery seller to "file with the tobacco tax 
administrator of the State into which such shipment is made ... a statement setting forth his 
name and trade name (if any), and the address of his principal place of business and of any other 
place of business." 15 U.S.C. § 376(a)(I). Consequently, Maybee has already provided the 
State with this same information required by the Minors' Access Act, by complying with the 
Jenkins Act. 
The State has a significant interest in preventing youth access to tobacco. In Rowe, 
Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion, raised concerns that "State measures to prevent 
youth access to tobacco ... are increasingly thwarted by the ease with which tobacco products 
can be purchased through the Internet." 128 S. Ct. at_. These concerns relate to the more than 
1800 websites offering to sell tobacco products, which do not report their sales to states, but do 
not relate to responsible delivery sellers who do report their sales. (COE #7, Ex. F at IDAG 
139650). 
The State does not disputed the fact that Maybee sells only to adult consumers for their 
personal use or that he reports all delivery sales, as required by Jenkins Act, to the State. (COE 
#6, ,i,i 17, 29). The State does not claim that Maybee has sold tobacco to minors or that his age 
verification procedures are inadequate to prevent youth access. As Maybee has repeatedly 
stated, he verifies the name, address and age of each Idaho consumer before he accepts an order 
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for a delivery sale. (COE #6 ,r2 I). Maybee also informs Idaho consumers that it is illegal to sell 
or give tobacco products to minors. (COE #6, if29, Ex. A). 
The Center for Disease Control 2004 National Youth Tobacco Survey14 found that 
minors purchase more cigarettes through vending machines than through Internet sales. More 
importantly, the survey showed that brick-and-mortar stores remain the overwhelming retail 
source for minors to purchase cigarettes illegally. According to the CDC study, minors who 
purchased cigarettes within the last 30 days of the survey stated that 63.5% of these purchases 
came from gas stations, convenience stores, grocery stores or drug stores. Vending machines 
accounted for 2.8%, while Internet sales only account for 2.3%. 
Between 2002 and 2007, multistate investigations have revealed that national retail 
chains, all of whom held multiple state licenses and permits, routinely made tobacco sales to 
minors. These investigations resulted in, at least, ten multistate settlement agreements15 with 
various corporations, including 7 Eleven, Inc., CVS Pharmacy, Rite Aid Corporation, Walgreens, 
Wal-Mart and Exxon Mobile Corporation. State Attorneys General found these retail giants 
made tobacco sales to minors at retail outlets located throughout the nation. Between 28 and 46 
states, including Idaho, were parties to these multistate settlement agreements. Civil penalties in 
these agreements ranged between $ I 00,000 and $437,500, with settlement proceeds being 
distributed among the settling states. These assurances, along with the CDC study, prove that 
14 The Center for Disease Control 2004 National Youth Tobacco Survey is available online at 
htlJ)://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data statistics/surveys/NYTS/index.htm. 
15 Copies of these Assurances of Voluntary Compliance are available for review online at 
htlJ):l/www.responsiblesellers.org/avc/ 
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face-to-face transactions do not ensure that only adults have access to tobacco. 
The State will no doubt argue that its ability to suspend or to revoke a tobacco permit 
deters retailers from making sales to minors. However, this deterrent effect had no impact on 
those national retail chains that were found to have routinely made tobacco sales to minors. In 
each instance, State Attorneys General did not seek to revoke or suspend these retail giants' 
licenses or permits. Instead, they focused their efforts into negotiating civil agreements that 
proscribed "best practices" for future tobacco sales. 
Maybee has adopted and implemented age-verification standards that effectively ensure 
that his delivery sales are not made to minors. (COE 6, Ex. A). The State has the ability to 
monitor and detect illegal sales by independently verifying the age of each customer whose name 
and address are given by Maybee to the State each month. Because face-to-face transactions are 
completed within seconds, the State has no mechanism to detect illegal sales after these sales 
have been completed. As it does with face-to-face sales, the State can conduct random, 
unannounced compliance checks to test Maybee's business practices to ensure that he is not 
selling tobacco to minors. These compliance checks can be conducted regardless of whether he 
has a permit or not. The State has more effective means to monitor Maybee's compliance than 
simply requiring him to obtain a permit. The State could, for example, use the same degree of 
effort, as it has used in this case, to seek fines, penalties or injunctive relief against Maybee 
when, if ever, it has evidence that Maybee has made an illegal sale to a minor. A state permit 
requirement, therefore, serves no legitimate regulatory purpose that cannot otherwise be 
achieved through other less intrusive means. 
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The State has failed to show that Maybee's conduct has off-reservation effects that 
impairs a significant state interest sought to be protected by the Minors' Access Act. As a matter 
of law, the District Court should have denied the State's motion for summary judgment and 
granted Maybee's cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated in Point II, we 
respectfully request that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Judgment entered against Maybee on February 
26, 2006 be reversed and that the District Court be directed to dismiss the State's second cause of 
action in its complaint alleging violations of the Minors' Access Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellant Maybee request that the Judgment entered 
against him on February 26, 2006 be reversed and that the District Court be directed to dismiss 
the State's complaint against him. 
Dated: September 22, 2008 
Boise, Idaho 
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